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行為遂行的発話と事実確認的発話

Explanations of the John Langshaw Austin' terms, illocutionary act and performative utterance

John Langshaw Austin, 1911-1960

解説:池田光穂


し かしながら、発話行為/発語行為(locutionary act)、発話内行為/発語内行為(illocutionary act)、および発語媒介行為(perlocutionary act)は、発語に立ちあう他者の存在が不可欠です。それを示したのが下図です。


医療人類学辞典

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発展課題:

【練習問題】

ジョン・サールの「間接スピーチアクツ (indirect speech acts)」について、以下の文章を要約解説しなさい
John Searle's theory of "indirect speech acts"

Searle has introduced the notion of an 'indirect speech act', which in his account is meant to be, more particularly, an indirect 'illocutionary' act. Applying a conception of such illocutionary acts according to which they are (roughly) acts of saying something with the intention of communicating with an audience, he describes indirect speech acts as follows: "In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer." An account of such act, it follows, will require such things as an analysis of mutually shared background information about the conversation, as well as of rationality and linguistic conventions.

In connection with indirect speech acts, Searle introduces the notions of 'primary' and 'secondary' illocutionary acts. The primary illocutionary act is the indirect one, which is not literally performed. The secondary illocutionary act is the direct one, performed in the literal utterance of the sentence (Searle 178). In the example:

    1. Speaker X: "We should leave for the show or else we’ll be late."
    2. (2) Speaker Y: "I am not ready yet."

Here the primary illocutionary act is Y's rejection of X's suggestion, and the secondary illocutionary act is Y's statement that Y is not ready to leave. By dividing the illocutionary act into two subparts, Searle is able to explain that we can understand two meanings from the same utterance all the while knowing which is the correct meaning to respond to.

With his doctrine of indirect speech acts Searle attempts to explain how it is possible that a speaker can say something and mean it, but additionally mean something else. This would be impossible, or at least it would be an improbable case, if in such a case the hearer had no chance of figuring out what the speaker means (over and above what they say and mean). Searle's solution is that the hearer can figure out what the indirect speech act is meant to be, and he gives several hints as to how this might happen. For the previous example Direct Speech and Indirect Speech "While direct speech purports to give a verbatim rendition of the words that were spoken, indirect speech is more variable in claiming to represent a faithful report of the content or content and form of the words that were spoken. It is important to note, however, that the question of whether and how faithful a given speech report actually is, is of a quite different order. Both direct and indirect speech are stylistic devices for conveying messages. The former is used as if the words being used were those of another, which are therefore pivoted to a deictic center different from the speech situation of the report. Indirect speech, in contrast, has its deictic center in the report situation and is variable with respect to the extent that faithfulness to the linguistic form of what was said is being claimed." (Florian Coulmas, "Reported Speech: Some General Issues.") a condensed process might look like this:

      1. Step 1: A proposal is made by X, and Y responded by means of an illocutionary act (2).
      2. Step 2: X assumes that Y is cooperating in the conversation, being sincere, and that Y has made a statement that is relevant.
      3. Step 3: The literal meaning of (2) is not relevant to the conversation.
      4. Step 4: Since X assumes that Y is cooperating; there must be another meaning to (2).
      5. Step 5: Based on mutually shared background information, X knows that they cannot leave until Y is ready. Therefore, Y has rejected X's proposition.
      6. Step 6: X knows that Y has said something in something other than the literal meaning, and the primary illocutionary act must have been the rejection of X's proposal.

Searle argues that a similar process can be applied to any indirect speech act as a model to find the primary illocutionary act (178). His proof for this argument is made by means of a series of supposed "observations" (ibid., 180-182)." (Source: Speech Act )" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speech_act

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